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MECHANICS' LIENS SUBJECT TO FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT GUARANTEES
Since the Supreme Court's 1969 invalidation of Wisconsin's prejudgment
wage garnishment statute in Sniadach v. Family FinanceCorp.,' a number of
creditors' remedies have been challenged successfully on fourteenth amendment procedural due process grounds. 2 Although the Court has mandated
differing safeguards in various transactions, 3 it has uniformly held that
where the machinery of the state is employed 4 to deprive a debtor of a significant property interest," he must be afforded notice and an opportunity to
be heard on the validity of the taking.6
The concept of due process implemented by Sniadach and its progeny 7
has been applied by the highest courts of two states to the imposition of mechanics' liens. In Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco
Masons Supplies Co.," Connecticut, in 1974, became the first jurisdiction in
1. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972) (landlord lien); Straley
v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973) (garagemen's liens);
Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (summary repossession provisions),
rev'd sub nom., Adams v. South California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1973); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (innkeeper's
lien); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (distress sales); Klim v.
Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (innkeeper's lien); Randone v. Appellate
Dep't. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971) (prejudgment attachment);
Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970)
(garnishment); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 150, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347
N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973) (innkeeper's lien); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172
N.W.2d 20 (1969) (garnishment).
3. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
4. Fourteenth amendment challenges to creditors' remedies must be based on state
involvement in the taking of property that goes beyond mere codification of a common
law remedy. Compare Northside Motors v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973) (no
state action in self-help repossession statute), with Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974) (state action found
in garagemen's lien). Since the mechanics' lien is created, regulated, and enforced by
the state, the presence of state action is clear. Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros.
Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 22-23, 353 A.2d 222, 227 (1976).
5. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972). See also Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
6. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971).
7. See cases cited note 3 supra.
8. 168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778 (1975), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 809
(1975) (for determination of whether the decision was based on federal or state
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which a mechanics' lien statute was struck down for failure to meet due

process requirements.

In February, 1976, the Maryland Court of Appeals

followed Connecticut's lead in Barry Properties,Inc. v. Fick Brothers Roof-

ing Co.,9 declaring portions of the state's mechanics' lien statute constitutionally infirm.

The states' development' 0 of the mechanics' lien was designed to encourage
and protect the efforts of those engaged in the often economically uncertain
construction industry." Simply defined, the statutes allow a person who has
furnished labor or material for the improvement of real property to force a
judicial sale of that property to satisfy unpaid claims. 12 The lien attaches
from the time labor or materials are furnished,' 3 and once perfected,'1 4 provides the lienor with a security interest in the property until the claim is
settled.'15
Many statutes require only the subcontractors and materialmen to provide
the owner with notice of their intention to claim a lien; the general contractors need only file a claim with the registry of deeds to create the lien,' 0
grounds), reaf 'd, 365 A.2d 393 (Conn. 1976) (decision was based on both federal and
state grounds), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 246 (1976).
9. 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976).
10. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have mechanics' lien
statutes. The relevant provisions of these statutes are set forth at 4 CCH SEC. TRANS.
GUIDE
61,201-62,226 (1969). In contrast, the federal government imposes a mandatory bonding system on its general contractors. 40 U.S.C. § 270(a)-(b) (1970). See
Comment, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds in the Building Trades, 68 YALE L.J. 138
(1958) for a well-documented article advocating the replacement of the mechanics' lien
statutes with mandatory bonding provisions.
11. For a discussion of the varied problems encountered by building contractors, see
Comment, supra note 10, at 139-40. The tenuous economic position of the construction
industry and its sensitivity to market and seasonal variations largely results from the
competitive bidding system employed by the industry. The general contractor and subcontractors must quote their prices in advance and then attempt to perform accordingly.
Thus, additional costs generated by weather problems, labor disputes, and varying market
conditions cannot be readily absorbed. Id. at 139.
12. Id. at 141.
13. 2 L. JONES, THE LAw OF IENS § 1389 (3d ed. 1914). See also 277 Md. at 30,
353 A.2d at 231.
14. In Maryland, the claimant perfects the lien by filing the claim with the court
clerk. 277 Md. at 30, 353 A.2d at 231, citing 1974 Md. Laws ch. 12, § 2, as amended,
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-103 (Supp. 1976). The Connecticut statute considered
in Roundhouse provided for perfection through the claimant recording the claim with
the register of deeds. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-34 (1958), as amended, (Supp.

1976).
15. See 2 L. JONES, supranote 13, § 1184.
16. See, e.g., 1974 Md. Laws ch. 12, § 2, as amended, MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 9-103 (Supp. 1976); 1881 Conn. Pub. Acts ch. 148, § 3, as amended, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-35 (Supp. 1976). Under the present statute, all claimants
are required to provide the owner with notice. Accord, 82 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 24 (Smith-
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giving rise to the possibility that the owner will have no notice of the lien
until a subsequent foreclosure action. Once recorded, the lien's cloud on
title can continue without further action by the claimant for a statutorily
defined period of time-usually no longer than two years.' 7 Thus, although the claimant must institute judicial proceedings to foreclose the lien,
the encumbrance on title created by the perfection of the claim continues
until either the statutory life expires, payment is made, or the owner institutes judicial proceedings to test the validity of the lien. 18 The adverse
impact of disputed title on the owner's ability to alienate or otherwise encumber his property pending determination of the claims on the merits is
the injury against which aggrieved property owners have sought fourteenth
amendment protection.
The Connecticut and Maryland courts' imposition of due process standards on this traditionally recognized remedy of the construction industry'9
broke with a long line of recent cases in which other jurisdictions have upheld
mechanics' lien statutes against fourteenth amendment challenges.2 0 This
article will examine the considerations underlying the courts' application of
fourteenth amendment standards to the mechanics' lien, and will assess the
potential impact of both rulings on the modification or alteration of present
lien procedures.
I.

DUE PROCESS AND CREDITORS' REMEDIES

Prior to its holding in Sniadach, the Supreme Court had consistently
sustained the constitutionality of ex parte prejudgment property seizures,
viewing the opportunity for a later decision on the merits as sufficient protection of a debtor's rights. 21 In Sniadach the Court invalidated a Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute which permitted a creditor, without
notice or prior hearing, to freeze the wages of an alleged debtor. Under the
Hurd 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1976);

IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 43-709 (Bums 1973); N.Y.

LIEN LAw § 11 (McKinney 1966).
17. The statutory life of the lien, however, varies considerably among the states.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-39 (Supp. 1976) (one year); 1974 Md. Laws
ch. 12, § 2 (one year); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 254 (Supp. 1976) (60 days); Oino
REv. CODE ANN. § 1311.13 (1962) (six years).
18. See 277 Md. at 20, 353 A.2d at 225-26, noting 1974 Md. Laws ch. 12, § 2,
as amended, MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-103 (Supp. 1976). See also 1881 Conn.
Pub. Acts ch. 148, § 5, 7, as amended, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-37, 49-39
(Supp. 1976).
19. S. PHiLLIPs, MEcHANIcS LIENS § 6 (2d ed. 1883).

20. See cases cited note 45 infra.
21. See McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929), affg 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699
(1928); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S.
94 (1921).
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statute, the summons was issued by a court clerk upon application by the
creditor's lawyer. 22 The Court held the statute's failure to provide the
debtor with notice and a hearing prior to garnishment violative of due process. 23 The fact that Sniadach dealt with a unique form of property (wages),
the deprivation of which had an obvious and devastating effect on the debtor
and his family, 24 left unclear the applicability of Sniadach's prior notice
and hearing requirements to other prejudgment seizures. The ambiguities of
the holding were evidenced in the subsequent split of the lower courts on
the ultimate parameters of procedural due process, many courts concluding
that Sniadach's holding should be confined to the facts of the case. 25
In Sniadach, Justice Harlan argued in a concurring opinion that a showing

of great harm resulting from the taking was not a condition precedent to
the imposition of due process safeguards. 26 This view of the necessity
for prior notice and hearing safeguards was largely adopted in Fuentes v.
Shevin, 27 in which the Court invalidated the prejudgment replevin statutes
of Florida and Pennsylvania. 28 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Stewart, noted that while the form of notice and hearing mandated by the
22. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 338-39 (1969).
23. Id. at 341-42.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); American Olean
Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970); Young v. Ridley, 309
F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970); Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463
P.2d 68 (1969); 300 West 154th Street Realty Co. v. Department of Bldgs., 26 N.Y.2d
538, 260 N.E.2d 534, 311 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1971). See also North Georgia Finishing
Corp. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 614 (1975) (Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
For decisions which held that Sniadach established general principles of procedural
due process, see, e.g., Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub
nom. Adams v. Southern California Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973); Collins
v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Santiago v. McElroy, 319
F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970);
Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971);
Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970);
Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
26. 395 U.S. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.07 (Supp. 1972-1973'); 12 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1821 et seq.
(1967). The Court noted that while the statutes required the creditor to post a bond
to protect the debtor from wrongful replevin, and provided for possible liability in
damages for mistaken seizure, their failure to afford the debtor a prior hearing
was constitutionally infirm, since the existing safeguards tested no more than the creditor's belief in his rights. The Court viewed this result as an insufficient substitute for
a hearing on the validity of the claim. 407 U.S. at 83.
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due process clause will vary with the particular property interest involved, 2
some form of notice and hearing must be provided before the deprivation of
any interest that is not de minimis.30 In a major expansion of the language
employed in Sniadach, the Court stated that, except in certain extraordinary
situations, 3 ' procedural due process requires notice and an adversary hearing
before a debtor can be even temporarily deprived of a possessory property
32
interest.
The broad language of Fuentes inspired a fresh series of challenges to
ex parte creditors' remedies. 3 The Court responded to this trend when, in
upholding the Louisiana sequestration statute in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co.,8 4 it criticized a uniform application of the prior notice and hearing rule
29. 407 U.S. at 82. For a general discussion of the considerations involved in determining the appropriate form of hearing, see, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
378 (1971); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
30. 407 U.S. at 86.
31. The Fuentes Court cited the following cases as examples of extraordinary circumstances justifying a failure to accord the procedural due process protections of notice
and a hearing prior to seizure: Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594
(1950) (misbranded drugs); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (prejudgment,
attachment necessary to secure quasi in rem jurisdiction); Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S.
94 (1921) (protection of public from bank failure); North American Storage Co. v.
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (contaminated food). 407 U.S. at 90-91 n.23. See also,
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (seizure of yacht
transporting marijuana).
The Fuentes Court established a three-part test strictly delineating the applicability of
the "extraordinary situations" exception to the imposition of fourteenth amendment
guarantees:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, -there has been a
special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control
over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has
been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards
of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular
instance.
407 U.S. at 91.
32. 407 U.S. at 84-86.
33. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Bay States Harness
Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, Inc. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass.
1973) (prejudgment real estate attachments); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank,
360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973) (prejudgment attachment statutes); Mason v. Garris,
360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (foreclosure of mechanics' liens); Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973) (garageman's lien remedies);
Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (landlord summary remedies).
For a state court decision which refused to consider Fuentes' 4-3 majority binding
precedent, see Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 108 Ariz. 508, 502 P.2d 1327 (1972).
The Arizona Court prophetically anticipated the effect of the votes of Justices Powell
and Rehnquist on the Fuentes prior hearing rule.
34. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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as creating an impractical and inflexible constitutional standard.8 5 In
distinguishing the statute from those overturned in Fuentes, the Court noted
that under the Louisiana statute the creditor had a present interest in the
subject property which could be defeated if the debtor transferred possession
or allowed the property to deteriorate during the pendency of the adversary
hearing. 80 The Court found debtors sufficiently protected from wrongful
deprivation by the statute's provisions for close judicial scrutiny of the creditor's factually based affidavit, penalties in the event of the creditor's failure
to substantiate the claim, and the debtor's ability to force an early post87
seizure hearing on the merits.
While Mitchell's dissenting Justices 8 viewed the decision as a sub silentio
overruling of Fuentes,89 the Court's recent decision in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem., Inc.,40 although stopping short of reinstituting the
prior hearing rule, reaffirmed the Court's intention to apply due process
standards to statutes affecting debtors' interests. In striking down a Georgia
statute providing for prejudgment garnishment (freezing) of a bank account,
the Court found the statute constitutionally deficient in that it failed to provide the safeguards contained in the Louisiana statute upheld in Mitchell.4 1
Unlike the Louisiana sequestration statute, the Georgia scheme did not require judicial supervision of the applications for the writ or provide the
42
debtor with an early post-seizure hearing.
Thus, after Mitchell and North Georgia it appears that the Court has
abandoned the strict prior hearing rule in favor of a procedural due process
test which examines the statute in its entirety to determine whether its provisions adequately accommodate the conflicting interests of the creditor,
35. Id. at 607-10.
36. Id. at 609. The Court's view is predicated on the premise that, upon being
informed of a hearing on the taking, the debtor would be encouraged to transfer possession of the subject property and thereby defeat the creditor's claim. The Court also
noted that the failure of the debtor to continue payments pending the hearing further
diminished the creditor's security. Id. at 608-09.
37. Id. at 605-06.
38. Mr. Justice Stewart was joined in his dissenting opinion by Justices Douglas and
Marshall.
39. 416 U.S. at 634-35 (Stewart, Douglas, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
40. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
41. Id. at 607.
42. GA. CODE ANN. § 46 et seq. (1967). Under the Georgia garnishment statute,
the only prerequisites to the creditor's obtaining the writ were that the creditor or his
lawyer execute an affidavit before a court clerk stating the amount claimed to be due,
and that the creditor file a bond equal to twice the amount claimed. See 419 U.S. at
602-03 n. 1.
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debtor, and state. 43 As Mitchell and North Georgia indicate, however, the
Court's post-Fuentes analysis of prejudgment taking of property has largely
focused on statutory safeguards which lessen the debtor's interest in a prior
44
hearing.

II. DUE PROCESS AND THE MECHANICS' LIENTHE PRE-Roundhouse COURTS

In the cases considering the application of procedural due process safeguards to mechanics' lien laws and similar real property attachment, several
courts4 5 have concluded that since the liens do not affect the owner's ability

to alienate or encumber the land, the lien is a de minimis taking not requiring
the imposition of due process safeguards. 46 Before the decision of the
Connecticut Supreme Court in Roundhouse,47 the only authority holding an
interference with property title cognizable under the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause stemmed from two 1973 federal district court decisions
concerning real property attachment statutes. 48 In Bay State Harness Horse
Racing & Breeding Association v. PPG Industries,49 the court found a
significant property interest affected since the attachment interfered with the

43. 416 U.S. at 607-10. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79
(1971) (indigent's challenge to court costs in divorce action); Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (dismissal of government employee as security
risk).
44. See 416 U.S. at 610.
45. Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432, 436 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (dicta); Cook v.
Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 27 (D.S.D. 1974); Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379
F. Supp. 997, 999 (D. Ariz. 1973), af'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974); Connolly Dev., Inc. v.
Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 191, 196-98 (Ct. App. 1974), aff'd, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477,
553 P.2d 637 (1976).
46. The courts found constitutionally significant the distinction between a total ban
on alienation, and the mechanics' lien's partial infringement of the owner's ability to
alienate at full market value. See Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432, 436 (S.D.
Fla. 1974); Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997, 999 (D. Ariz.
1973). Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 27 (D.S.D. 1974). The Spielman-Fond
court noted that a complete ban on alienation would be subject to fourteenth amendment
strictures. 379 F. Supp. at 999, citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 12 (1948);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917); Kass v. Lewin, 104 So. 2d 572 (Fla.
1958).
47. 168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778 (1975), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 809
(1975), reaff'd, 365 A.2d 393 (Conn. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 246 (1976).
48. The real property attachment remedy's effect on land is identical to that of the
mechanics' lien; however, unlike the mechanics' lien claimant, the applicant for attachment has no prior interest in the involved property. See Comment, The Constitutional
Validity of Mechanics' Liens Under the Due Process Clause-A Re-examination After
Mitchell and North Georgia, 55 B.U.L. Ru',. 263, 275 (1975).
49. 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973).
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owner's ability to sell or mortgage the property at full market value. 50
Similarly, in Gunter v. Merchant's Warren National Bank,5' the owner's

ability to convey clear title was considered constitutionally significant. 52
In spite of these decisions, and the fact that identical interests are affected
by real property attachments and mechanics' liens, courts continued to find
due process inapplicable to the latter.5 3 It is interesting to note that these
courts did not separate their consideration of the significance of the fourteenth amendment interest affected by the lien from their analysis of the stat-

utory provisions governing its imposition. Thus, in Ruocco v. Brinker,54 a
federal district court, in upholding Florida's mechanics' lien statute from constitutional attack, stated that the deprivation engendered by the lien was de
minimis, 55 but based its holding on the statute's constitutionally adequate accommodation of the competing interests of the claimant and owner. 56
50. Id. at 1305. Relying heavily on Fuentes, the court imposed a strict prior hearing
rule on real estate attachment. Id. at 1307. See also Gunter v. Merchant's Warren Nat'1
Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085, 1090-91 (D. Me. 1973).
In invalidating the Massachusetts attachment statute, the court noted that the unrestricted use of property has been recognized as a right which may be protected from even
temporary deprivation. 365 F. Supp. at 1305, citing Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369
U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Seattle Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
51. 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973). In the wake of Mitchell and North Georgia,
the United States District Court for the District of Maine has abandoned Gunter's prior
hearing rule. In Re Oronoka, 393 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Me. 1975). The Oronoka court
did not dispute Gunter's ruling that the attachment statute affected a significant property
interest, but merely found that the owner's ability under the Maine Rules of Civil
Procedure to obtain a hearing two days after the attachment satisfied the requirements
of procedural due process. The early hearing provision had not yet been enacted at
the time Gunter was decided. See 393 F. Supp. at 1315 n.6.
52. 360 F. Supp. at 1090. See also Clement v. Four N. State St. Corp., 360 F. Supp.
933 (D.N.H. 1973) (notice and hearing required before attachment). But see Black
Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Conn. 1971), where the court
ruled a $4,500,000 attachment de minimis since the property was already encumbered
by liens of $22,000,000.
53. See cases cited note 45 supra. The only attempt at distinguishing either Gunter
or PPG occurred in Connolly, where the California court noted that unlike mechanics'
lien statutes, the attachment statute considered in Gunter absolutely prohibited alienation. The Maine attachment provision's absolute bar on transfer stemmed from the
subject property's being placed in the custody of the court, upon attachment, to prevent
alienation. 416 Cal. Rptr. at 197 n.4. The filing of a mechanics' lien claim, however,
does not absolutely bar alienation; it merely informs prospective purchasers of the
property's disputed title. See, e.g., Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 29 (D.S.D. 1974);
Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997, 999 (D. Ariz. 1973), affd, 417

U.S. 901 (1974).
54. 380 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
55. Id. at 436.
56. Id. at 437. Accord, Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 191,
197 (Ct. App. 1974), aff'd, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477, 553 P.2d 637 (1976).
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The dual thrust of the Ruocco holding is surprising since its conclusion
that only a de minimis deprivation was present seemingly obviated the necessity of testing the statute's accommodation of interests.5 7 The decision
is understandable, however, as the court's conclusion that the interest affected
by the lien was de minimis was not based on finding the owner's ability to
alienate or encumber his property constitutionally insignificant; rather the
court focused on the statute's effect on this interest and labeled the resulting
short-term infringement de minimis.58 In reaching this conclusion, the court
noted the owner's ability to institute show cause proceedings with a return
date of 20 days 59 or to force the claimant to bring foreclosure proceedings within 60 days or forfeit the lien.6 0 Considering these provisions in
conjunction with the fact that the lien would be discharged if not enforced
within one year, the Ruocco court concluded that the state's failure to mandate a hearing prior to or immediately following the imposition of the lien
was constitutionally permissible under Mitchell's "flexible test" of procedural
due process. 61
Similarly, in Cook v. Carlson,62 another federal district court, in holding
the mechanic's lien's effect on the owner's interest not cognizable under the
fourteenth amendment, emphasized statutory provisions that protected the
owner from an unfair or mistaken property seizure.63 Unlike the Ruocco
court, however, which after concluding that the owner's deprivation was de
minimis, posited no countervailing interests of the creditor or state in avoiding the strictures of a prior hearing, the Cook court stated that prior notice
and hearing would destroy the effectiveness of the lien remedy by creating
an interim period pending the hearing during which bona fide purchasers
and encumbrancers could tie into the property and hinder the claimant's
57. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 607 (1974).
58. The Ruocco court employed the term de minimis to refer to the nature of the
deprivation, rather than in reference to the property interest involved. In this approach
it followed the analysis of Justice Harlan in Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 342 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Harlan approach examines the statute to determine whether the "deprivation" it exacts is significant. Under the Fuentes approach,
on the other hand, the court first considers whether the "property interest" involved
is de minimis and thus requires procedural safeguards. See 407 U.S. at 90 n.21. Although the Harlan approach focuses more closely on the statute's effect on the
deprivation, the distinction between it and the Fuentes approach is not great, for in the
final analysis both appraise the sufficiency of the statute's procedural protections. See
Comment, supra note 48, at 266 n.24.
59. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.21(4) (1969).
60. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.22 (1969).
61. 380 F. Supp. at 437.
62. 364 F. Supp. 24 (D.S.D. 1973).
63. Id. at 27-28.
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ability to exact compensation. 64 Noting the legislative intent to protect
the vulnerable and important construction industry, 65 the court concluded
that the statute provided adequate procedural protection for the owner's
insignificant interest. 66
In Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc.,67 the district court found it
unnecessary to analyze the adequacy of the protections afforded the debtor
under the Arizona mechanic's lien statute,68 concluding simply that since
the lien involved no dispossession or actual taking of property, procedural
due process was inapplicable.6 9 The United States Supreme Court's sum-

mary affirmance of the holding in Spielman-Fond70 raised the possibility
that the case would be considered binding precedent on the fourteenth amend71
ment issue.
The reasoning of the pre-Roundhouse courts is notable for its failure to
assess seriously the adverse impact of the lien on the owner's ability to alienate or encumber the subject property. In focusing on statutory safeguards
and other means 72 by which the owner could ameliorate the lien's cloud on
title, the courts conveniently bypassed the pre-eminent question of whether
the imposition of a lien requires fourteenth amendment safeguards.
III.

Roundhouse
7

AND

Fick Brothers-FACIALLY

INVALID

STATUTES

74

In Roundhouse 8 and Fick Brothers, the owner's intercession of a fourteenth amendment defense to -the imposition of the mechanics' lien occurred
64. Id.
65. Id. at 29. The court termed the application for a lien an exceptional situation
requiring special protection to a creditor interest. But cf. discussion at note 31 supra.
66. 364 F. Supp. at 29. In upholding the statute the court stated it to be narrowly
drawn in that the lien was valid only against bona fide purchasers, extended only to
the labor and materials furnished, and could be challenged within 30 days of the
owner's notice to the creditor that the lien was contested. Id.
67. 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973), afj'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
68. AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-981 etseq. (1974).
69. 379 F. Supp. at 999.
70. 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
71. See In re Oronoka, 393, F. Supp. 1311 (D. Me. 1975). The Oronoka court
cited the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Spielman-Fond as widening the
Court's substantial modification of the constitutional principles articulated in Fuentes.
Id. at 1316. See also note 46 supra.
72. See Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997, 999 (D. Ariz.
1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974). The court noted that any economic interests infringed by the lien could be protected by bonding or title insurance. Since these economic interests were held to be de minimis, the court did not discuss the applicability of
procedural safeguards. 379 F. Supp. at 999.
73. 168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778 (1975), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 809
(1975), reaffd, 365 A.2d 393 (Conn. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 246 (1976).
74. 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976).
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during the claimant's action to foreclose the lien.7 5 In the Connecticut
action, the constitutional defense was one of several defenses interposed by
the owner after disputes had arisen under the contract causing the owner to
cease payments and the contractor to abandon the project. 76 In contrast,
in the Maryland case, the claimant fully and satisfactorily performed its
obligations and the only defense tendered by the owner was the fourteenth
77
amendment claim.
The courts prefaced their consideration of the constitutionality of the
statutory schemes by setting forth the relevant statutory provisions. In both
states the lien attached from the time labor or materials were furnished7 s and
could be perfected without judicial participation. 79 Only the subcontractors
and materialmen who did not directly contract with the original owner were
required to provide the owner with notice of the claim.8 0 Under the Maryland scheme, the lien could exist for one year without the claimant instituting
foreclosure proceedings,81 unless the owner moved to dissolve the lien by
filing a bond8 2 or by bringing proceedings in equity to compel the claimant
either to prove the lien's validity or have it declared void.83 Similarly, the
Roundhouse court noted the owner's ability to discharge the lien prior to the

75. 362 A.2d at 779; 277 Md. at 21, 353 A.2d at 226. In Roundhouse, there were
claims by both the prime contractor and subcontractors, although only the prime contractor appealed the Superior Court's ruling that the lien statute was unconstitutional.
362 A.2d at 779.
The Fick Brothers claim was lodged by a subcontractor, and the case reached the
Court of Appeals from a denial of plaintiff Barry Properties' motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the lien statute deprived it of its property without procedural due process. 277 Md. at 21, 353 A.2d at 226-27.
76. 362 A.2d at 779.
77. 277 Md. at 21, 353 A.2d at 226-27.
78. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-33 (1958); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-105
(1974).
79. Under the Connecticut mechanics' lien statute, the lien was perfected by recording
the lien with the town registrar of deeds. 1881 Conn. Pub. Acts ch. 148, § 2, as
amended, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-34 (Supp. 1976). The Maryland scheme provided for perfection through the lienor filing the claim with the court clerk. 1974
Md. Laws ch. 2, § 2, as amended, MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-103 (Supp. 1976).
80. 1881 Conn. Pub. Acts ch. 148, § 3, as amended, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-35 (Supp. 1976); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 9-103(a)-(d) (Supp. 1976).
As amended, the Connecticut statute now requires the subcontractors and materialmen
to provide the owner with notice of the claim. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-35 (Supp.
1976), formerly 1881 Conn. Pub. Acts cl. 148, § 3.
81. 1974 Md. Laws ch. 12, § 2.
82. MD.R. P. BG75(6).
83. See Continental Steel Corp. v. Sugarman, 266 Md. 544, 548, 295 A.2d 493, 494
(1972).
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termination of its two-year statutory life by posting bond8 4 or by demanding
the lienor's discharge of the lien, thus forcing the institution of foreclosure
proceedings within 30 days.8 5
Unlike the Cook and Ruocco decisions, the Maryland and Connecticut
courts did not consider the significance of the deprivation created by the lien
in conjunction with the statutory provisions which allegedly rendered its
impact de minimis. Rather, the courts separated their consideration of the
constitutional significance of the owner's property interest from their analysis
of the existing procedures afforded the debtor, 6 and concluded that the
mechanics' lien affected a fourteenth amendment property interest. The
Roundhouse court based its finding solely on the lien's impairment of the
owner's ability freely to alienate the subject property.8 7 The Maryland
Court of Appeals concurred in this ruling, and additionally deemed of constitutional import the lien's effect of diminishing the owner's equity, noting
that the lien deprived the corporate owner of its construction mortgage and
rendered it unable to close a permanent mortgage or obtain additional
8
financing on the property's equity.
In concluding that due process was applicable to the mechanics' lien
statutes, however, both courts were vague on the fourteenth amendment safeguards to be extended to the debtor. The Fick Brothers court, noting the
remedial nature of the statute, held the existing statute constitutional when
read as if containing prior notice and hearing requirements.8 9 The court
strongly implied that a newly enacted statute incorporating the Mitchell and
North Georgia safeguards of judicial supervision of the application for the
writ and a prompt post-seizure hearing on the merits of the taking, would be
constitutional.9" In contrast, the Connecticut court did not expressly estab84. 1881 Conn. Pub. Acts ch. 148, § 5, as amended, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 49-37 (Supp. 1976).
85. 1881 Conn. Pub. Acts ch. 148, § 7, as amended, CONN. GENx. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-39 (Supp. 1976).
86. The Connecticut and Maryland courts followed the fourteenth amendment analysis employed by the Fuentes court, and thus focused on the "property interest" affected

by the
87.
88.
89.
90.

lien rather than the "deprivation" wrought by the statute. See note 58 supra.
362 A.2d at 784.
277 Md. at 24, 353 A.2d at 228.
Id. at 37, 353 A.2d at 235.
Id. at 30, 353 A.2d at 231:
What we glean from Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia Fin-

ishing is that, lacking extraordinary circumstances, statutory prejudgment cred-

itor remedies which even temporarily deprive a debtor of a significant property
interest without notice and an opportunity for a prior probable-cause-type
hearing are, as held in Fuentes, unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause unless safeguards such as those mentioned in
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lish guidelines for the legislature's drafting of a constitutionally satisfactory
statute, although it did note that the Arizona mechanics' lien statute, which
restricted the life of a non-foreclosed lien to six months and had been summarily upheld by the Supreme Court in Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's,
Inc., 91 could be interpreted as offering "the bare minimum of due process
92
protection consistent with the extent of the deprivation present."
The Maryland court distinguished the Arizona scheme approved in Spielman-Fond on the basis of its short statutory life and its requirement that the
lien application be made under oath on personal knowledge.93 These distinctions, however, are superficial at best, since the Supreme Court has
indicated that even temporary deprivations are to be accorded the full panoply of procedural safeguards mandated by the due process clause, subject
only to the caveat that the extent of the deprivation will affect the form of
the hearing required. 94 Since both the Roundhouse and Fick Brothers courts
held procedural due process applicable to the mechanics' lien, it is reasonable
to conclude that the courts chose not to consider the Supreme Court's sum95
mary affirmance in Spielman-Fonda binding precedent.
The courts' refusal to reject explicitly Spielman-Fond is incompatible with

the broad holdings set forth in the cases. By the same token, the Maryland
court's application of its interpretation of the law to the facts before it in
Fick Brothers casts doubt on the case's ultimate impact. The court concluded that since the property owner knew of the subcontractor's claim prior
Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing are present and even then, although this
is less clear, the law may be invalid if the issues underlying the seizure are not
susceptible to uncomplicated documentary proof or if the creditor does not
have a present interest in the property seized.
Id. at 37 n.12, 353 A.2d at 235 n.12.
91. 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
92. 362 A.2d at 783.
93. 277 Md. at 34-35, 353 A.2d at 233-34.
94. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-86 (1972). See also North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
95. The Fick Brothers court quoted extensively from Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1975), where the Chief Justice
stated:
When [the Supreme Court] summarily affirm[s], without opinion, the judgment
of a three-judge District Court [the Court] affirm[s] the judgment but not
necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached. An unexplicated summary
affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after
full argument. Indeed, upon fuller consideration of an issue under plenary
review, the Court has not hesitated to discard a rule which a line of summary
affirmances may have appeared to have established (footnote omitted).
277 Md. at 34, 353 A.2d at 233.
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to the foreclosure action, and did not assert a demand for a hearing, it thereby
forfeited any right it may have had to have its position determined prior to
the foreclosure hearing.9 6 The court also concluded that since the claimant
did not divest the owner of any property interest prior to the foreclosure
hearing, only a possibility of a lien existed prior to the judicial determination.9 7 As the dissenting justices noted, however, these conclusions contradict the majority's earlier assertions9" that the statute permitted a significant
property deprivation prior to the ultimate adjudication on the merits.99
The most restrictive interpretation that can be placed on the Fick Brothers
majority's resolution of the issues for the parties involved is that'the court's
opinion amounts to a mere advisory opinion, in view of its holding that the
property owner suffered no denial of due process. 100 The holding subjects
the opinion to criticism as an example of judicial legislation since the court's
failure to discharge the subcontractor's lien suggests that it was utilizing the
case as a vehicle to substantially amend the lien statute. A broader reading
of the decision, however, would view it as one made in the interests of judicial economy, the lower court having determined that the subcontractor's
claim was valid in all respects. Thus, the court, while establishing prospective due process requirements, may have concluded that their application to
the parties before it would unfairly penalize the subcontractor.' 0 '
IV.

THE EXTENT OF THE DEPRIVATION

In viewing the significance of the property interest affected by the lien as
a matter unrelated to the protections afforded by the particular statute, the
Roundhouse and Fick Brothers courts have broken with a long but dubious
line of cases holding the imposition of a mechanics' lien exempt from fourteenth amendment procedural due process. By focusing solely on the statutory provisions which allegedly rendered the lien's impact de minimis, the
prior case law failed to assess adequately the immediate and collateral effects
of the lien on the owner's property interests.
96. 277 Md. at 38, 353 A.2d at 235-36.
97. Id. at 38, 353 A.2d at 236.
98. Id. at 39-40, 353 A.2d at 237 (Levine and Eldridge, JJ., dissenting). The dissenters concurred in the court's holding that the statute was facially invalid.
99. See id. at 40, 353 A.2d at 235.
100. See id. at 40, 353 A.2d at 237 (Levine and Eldridge, JJ., dissenting).
101. The court noted that in neither North Georgia, Mitchell, Fuentes, nor Sniadach
was there a determination on the merits of the creditor's claim.

Instead, the debtors

attacked the prejudgment remedy involved by way of injunction, declaratory judgment,
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 603-05 (1975); Mitchell
motion to dismiss, or similar procedure. Id. at 38 n.14, 353 A.2d at 236 n.14.
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The pre-Roundhouse courts felt that the mechanics' lien did not infringe
on the owner's right to alienate the property but at most made alienation
more difficult. 10 2 However, in many jurisdictions the lien laws are so
drafted that the claims may exceed the cost of the improvements, and often

even the market value of the property. 10 3 Such claims effectively negate
the owner's fourteenth amendment right to alienate the property. 10 4 This
impairment of alienation coupled with the lien's effect on the owner's

ability to obtain financing on the property's equity' 0 5 can have a potentially
devastating impact on the property owner.
The pre-Roundhouse courts also failed to make a realistic evaluation of
the existing statutes' safeguards against wrongful deprivations. Although one
court implied that the owner's ability to substitute a bond for the lien claim

protected his ability to alienate or encumber the property, 10 6 it is evident
that the bond is not only an insufficient substitute for a hearing, 1 7 but also
exacts its own independent property deprivation.' 0 8 Similarly, the Ruocco
and Cook courts' emphasis on the owner's ability to compel the claimant to
establish the lien's validity' 0 9 does not address the fact that many statutes fail
102. See, e.g., Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432, 436 (S.D. Fla. 1974); SpielmanFond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997, 999 (D. Ariz. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S.
901 (1974); Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 27 (D.S.D. 1974).
103. Under the so-called Pennsylvania system, followed by 30 states including
Maryland, the owner's payments to the general contractor prior to the lien's imposition
are not a defense to the claims of subcontractors or materialmen. See, e.g., Bryant v.
Stempkowski, 88 Pa. Super. 390 (1926); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-601 (1947); 1974 Md.
Laws ch. 12, § 2, as amended, MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-103 (Supp. 1976).
104. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 12 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60, 74 (1917).
105. See 277 Md. at 24, 353 A.2d at 226-27. See also Ominsky, The Mechanics'
Lien Filed Despite a No-Lien Stipulation: Methods of Prevention and Removal, 72
DicK. L. REV. 223, 234-38 (1968).
106. See Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997, 999 (D. Ariz.
1973), afI'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
107. 362 A.2d at 784; 277 Md. at 37-39, 353 A.2d at 233-35 (by implication). In
Roundhouse the Connecticut court stated:
The provision in General Statutes § 49-37 for the dissolution of a mechanics'
lien upon the substitution of a bond does not offer adequate relief, since the
authority of the court is limited to the issuance of an order dissolving the lien
only upon the substitution of a bond "in such amount as a court of competent
jurisdiction may adjudge to have been secured by such lien." In such a proceeding, "[t]he office of the judge before whom the application is pending, is
to discover the amount of the plaintiff's apparent claim, and not to pass upon
its legal validity or to weigh the chances of recovery upon it."
Id., quoting Sachs v. Nussenbaum, 92 Conn. 682, 688, 104 A. 393, 395 (1918).
108. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 (1972).
109. 380 F. Supp. at 432; 364 F. Supp. at 27-28.
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to ensure that the owner will receive notice of the lien. 110 Moreover, since
such actions are subject to the delays inherent in all litigation,"' the egregious
effects of the lien can subsist for a considerable period of time.
Since the statutory provisions cited by the pre-Roundhouse courts as protective of the owner's interest are inadequate to prevent the mistaken or
wrongful deprivation which procedural due process is designed to prevent,"12
it is evident that once the owner demonstrates the significance of the property
interests infringed upon by the lien, the existing statutes must be voided for
failure to protect the debtor's constitutionally recognized property interests.
The ultimate form of the safeguards to be afforded the lien-affected owner
will be dictated by the competing interests of the owner, the creditor, and
the state."13
V.

Roundhouse AND Fick Brothers-EVOLVING

STANDARDS?

The Connecticut court, while stating conclusively that fourteenth amendment safeguards must be applied to the imposition of a mechanics' lien, failed
to establish precise due process standards. The price to be paid for bequeathing the task of implementing new lien procedures to the legislature
was illustrated by the post-Roundhouse amendments to Connecticut's lien
statute. The most substantial changes occurred through introduction of a
notice requirement for general contractors,1 4 and a reduction of the lien's
statutory life to one year." 5 The amended statute does not, however, require
a hearing on the validity of the claim prior to the foreclosure action, unless
the owner institutes proceedings to contest the lien." 6 Since the burden of
obtaining a hearing remains with the aggrieved owner, the amended statute
fails to insure that the owner will receive the meaningful opportunity to be
7
heard required by the fourteenth amendment."1
110.
§ 9-103
ANN. §
111.
112.

1974 Md. Laws ch. 12, § 2, as amended, MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
(Supp. 1976); 1881 Conn. Pub. Acts ch. 148, § 3, as amended, CONN. GEN. STAT.
49-35 (Supp. 1976).
See Comment, supra note 48, at 283.
North Georgia Finishing Corp. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1975).

113. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-93 (1972).
114. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-35 (Supp. 1976).
115. Id. § 49-39.
116. Id. Under the amended statute the owner must provide the claimant with
notice at least four days before the hearing. Previously the owner was required to
order the lienor to discharge the lien and was entitled to a hearing only if the lienor

failed to discharge the lien within 30 days. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-51 (1958).
117. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 (1972). The Court found the replevin
statutes' provision for the debtor's recovery of the goods upon the posting of bond an
inadequate substitute for a mandatory hearing on the validity of the taking, reasoning
that not all debtors were possessed of the knowledge or the funds to utilize the recovery
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The Fick Brothers court suggested that a newly enacted statute incorporating the Mitchell and North Georgia safeguards of judicial supervision of
the application for the writ and a prompt post-seizure hearing on the merits
of the taking would satisfy constitutional requirements. 1 8 While allowing
for legislative modification of the strict prior hearing rule established by the"
court, this approach effectively circumscribed the legislature's discretion in
enacting a statutory scheme containing provisions less protective of the debtor's property interests than those approved in Mitchell and North Georgia.119
Although the court did not specifically state that any relaxation of the prior
hearing rule must be justified by a corresponding interest of the creditor or
state in avoiding the prior hearing, its reliance on Mitchell and North Georgia
indicated that such legislation must not only be justified by a countervailing
state interest in avoiding a prior hearing, but must also result in safeguards
120
for the debtor comparable to those afforded by a prior hearing.
The significance of the Fick Brothers court's emphasis on Mitchell and
North Georgia safeguards is reflected in the newly enacted Maryland mechanics' lien statute.' 21 The statute directs the court to review all lien claims
prior to their attachment.' 22 If the court determines that the lien should
attach, it issues the owner an order to show cause that the claim is invalid.
The owner is assured an opportunity to challenge the claim within 15
2
days of receiving the court order.' 3
provision.

Id. The failure of the Connecticut statute to relieve the owner of the burden

of protecting his or her constitutional rights appears constitutionally deficient under this
formulation of procedural due process.
118. 277 Md. at 37 n.12, 353 A.2d at 235 n.12.
119. In suggesting the constitutionality of a statutory scheme incorporating North
Georgia safeguards, the Maryland court emphasized the utility of a lienor's provision

of a bond as a safeguard against wrongful takings. Although such a provision was
deemed significant in Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 602-03, the strong legislative policy favoring
the mechanic's lien renders unlikely the possibility that such a requirement would be
imposed on the construction industry. As a practical matter, a bond provision would
be largely superfluous in a statutory scheme incorporating the North Georgia safeguards

of a factual inquiry by a neutral officer prior to the taking and a prompt post-seizure
hearing.
120. However, in many situations the provision of a prior hearing may be the only
means by which the owner can be insulated from the effects of a wrongful taking.
See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971) (hearing required prior to suspension of driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (hearing
required prior to termination of welfare benefits).

121. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-101 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
122. Id. § 9-106.
123. Id. If the court finds that the lien should not attach or should not attach in
the amount claimed, it issues an interlocutory order establishing the lien, stating the
amount for which probable cause exists, and specifying the amount of bond the owner
must post to free the property from the lien.

The court may also require the claimant
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The statute adopts the Court of Appeals' position that prior to judicial
determination of the lien's validity the claimant possesses only a possibility
of a lien. 1 24 The statute thus allows an owner to defeat the lien claim by
transferring the subject property to a bona fide purchaser for value.1 25 Although this provision of the statute imposes a prior hearing rule, it would
appear that a claimant could utilize the state's lis pendens procedure to
protect his interest in the property. 120 The lis pendens serves notice that
litigation is pending and subjects the interests of future purchasers to the
outcome of the litigation. 12' The continued availability of this procedure
recognizes that a requirement of prior notice and hearing jeopardizes the
creditor's interest in preventing the owner from alienating or encumbering

the land to defeat the outstanding claims,'128 and thus preserves the state's
interest, as evidenced by the legislative history underlying the lien statutes,' 29
in insuring that those who contribute labor or materials to a construction
project are compensated for their efforts and risks in that enterprise. 8 0
Also, since the greatest property taking effected through present statutes
occurs through their failure to insure the owner an early opportunity to clear
title, a short delay in providing the owner notice and an opportunity to be
heard does not create the type of irreparable harm often cited by the courts
as necessitating a hearing prior to the taking."'

Of particu!ar importance to the legislative reconsideration of the Maryland
lien statute was the court's perception of the function of the hearing on the
validity of the claim. While the Roundhouse court noted that notice and an
opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meanto post bond for damages. All disputed matters must be tried within six months of
the order, although the owner may move for modification or dissolution of the order
at any time prior to the trial. Id.
124. 277 Md. at 38, 353 A.2d at 235-36; 1976 Md. Laws ch. 349, § 9-106. The
statute reflects the court's incongruous finding that the lien claim in Fick Brothers had
involved no dispossession. 277 Md. at 38, 353 A.2d at 236. The court failed to note
that it is the lien claim's cloud on title and not its judicial validation per se which affects
the owner's fourteenth amendment interest.
125. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-102(c) (Supp. 1976).

126. MD. R.P. BD 1.
127. H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1294 (3d Ed. 1939).
128. The lienor's interest in preventing the owner from having notice of the claim
prior to perfection is similar to the interests which the Mitchell court found to militate
against providing the debtor with prior notice and hearing safeguards. See note 36
& accompanying text supra.
129. See S. PHILLIPS, MECHANICS' LiENs § 6 (2d ed. 1883).
130. Id. See generally Comment, supra note 10.
131. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970); Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969).
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ingful manner, 132 it did not indicate whether the state must require a preforeclosure hearing on the validity of all lien claims. This formulation of
the hearing question suggests that the lien is presumed to be valid until the
owner assumes the burden of challenging the claim. 13 3 In contrast, the
Fick Brothers court, in discussing North Georgia, indicated that the burden
of establishing the lien's validity rests with the claimant.' 3 4 The Fick Brothers court's formulation is incompatible with a statutory scheme which requires the owner to initiate time-consuming and costly procedures to protect
himself from a wrongful taking. 135 The Maryland legislature's reconsideration of the lien statute reflects the court's approach by requiring judicial
supervision of the lien application and guaranteeing the owner an early
opportunity to contest the court's probable cause determination. 3 6
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although Roundhouse and Fick Brothers do not delineate the precise
scope of the safeguards to be applied to mechanics' lien statutes, the decisions,
in recognizing the extent of the property interests affected, provide a means
by which the courts and legislatures can begin the evolutionary process of
developing equitable lien procedures. The Fick Brothers court's promulgation of general guidelines based on Mitchell and North Georgia for implementing these procedures, while inadequately assessing the competing interests affected by the lien statute, substantially insured that any legislative
reassessment of the lien statutes would not jeopardize the owner's right to
an early hearing on the validity of the claim. These guidelines diminished
the possibility that the Maryland legislature would follow post-Roundhouse
Connecticut in enacting a statute failing to guarantee a pre-foreclosure adversary hearing. In directing the focus of any legislative reconsideration of
the lien statute, the Maryland Court of Appeals provided a more solid
foundation than did the Connecticut Court for the expansion of debtors'
constitutional rights to the imposition of liens, since a procedural scheme
132. 362 A.2d at 781.
133. The newly amended statute, however, has greatly simplified the procedure
through which the owner can seek to discharge or reduce the lien.

The hearing is

limited to a determination of whether probable cause exists for sustaining the claim,
and thus enables the knowledgeable owner to remove a wrongful claim with a minimum
of legal preparation and expense. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-39 (Supp. 1976).
134. 277 Md. at 28-29, 353 A.2d at 231, citing North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975).
135. See note 117 supra.
136. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-106 (Supp. 1976).
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which provides the debtor with only the possibility of a hearing imposes
safeguards which are illusory at best.
The single flaw in the Maryland legislature's response to Fick Brothers
is the possibility that the statute creates for the owner to defeat the claim by
transferring title prior to the court's imposition of the lien. However, to the
extent that the lis pendens remains a viable creditor's remedy, the Maryland
scheme's adoption of Fick Brothers' call for judicial supervision of the claimant's perfection of the lien, and a prompt hearing to establish at least probable cause for the claim, preserves the remedial purpose of the mechanics'
lien while protecting the owner's property interests from wrongful deprivation. So interpreted, the statute preserves the interests of all parties in an
expeditious and equitable scheme, and is in the best tradition of flexible due
process.
Stephen C. Skubel

